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FRIENDLY PRECEDENT
ANTHONY NIBLETT & ALBERT H. YOON*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores which legal precedents judges choose to sup-
port their decisions. When describingthe legal landscape in a written
opinion, which precedent do judges gravitate toward?We examine
the idea that judges are more likely to cite friendly precedent. A
friendly precedent, here, is one that was delivered by Supreme Court
Justices who have similar political preferences to the lower court
judges deliveringthe opinion. In this Article, we test whether a feder-
al Court of Appeals panel is more likely to engage with binding
Supreme Court precedent when the political flavor of that precedent
is aligned with the political composition of the panel.
We construct a unique dataset of 591,936 citations to United States
Supreme Court decisions by the federal Courts of Appeals in 127,668
unanimous decisions from 1971 to 2007. We find that judges grav-
itate toward friendly precedent. The political composition of a panel
consistently influences which bindingprecedent is cited in the writ-
ten opinion. All Republican-appointed panels gravitate toward the
most conservative precedent; all Democratic-appointed panels gravi-
tate toward the most liberal precedent and unfavorably cite the most
conservative precedent. This result is notable because it provides
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strong evidence that judges, when reasoning their decisions, have
different conceptions of bindingprecedent.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are invited to a party. Upon entering a crowded
room, you see people that you know and like, those you know but
dislike, and still others whom you do not even know. To whom do
you gravitate? Do you converse with your existing circle of friends?
Do you exchange pleasantries with your adversaries? Do you strike
up conversation with strangers?
This familiar hypothetical is the motivation for this Article exam-
ining judicial behavior.1 When a judge writes an opinion, she will
see binding precedent from judges whom she likes, and other prece-
dent from judges with whom she may not see eye-to-eye. Which
precedent does a judge gravitate toward when writing the opinion?
In this Article, we examine the idea that a judge will gravitate to-
ward citing friendly precedent. Friendliness, here, is measured in
terms of similar political preferences. Specifically, we test whether
a federal Court of Appeals panel is more likely to engage with bind-
ing Supreme Court precedent when the political flavor of that
precedent is aligned with the political alignment of the panel.
Since at least the early twentieth century, legal scholars have
sought to understand how judges decide cases. Within jurisprudence
circles, the debate pitted formalism against realism: formalists ar-
gued that legal problem-solving was a deductive process contained
within the rules themselves;2 realists rejected the centrality of rules
in favor of nonlegal factors, including pragmatism.3 The inter-
disciplinary debate has largely focused on whether judges act in
1. The hypothetical is based on Judge Harold Leventhals famous description of when
and how judges decide to use legislative history as looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History:
Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making,
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419 (2009); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of
Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983).
2. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: WITH
REFERENCES AND CITATIONS, at vi (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871); Thomas C. Grey,
Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 495-96 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
3. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 110-11 (2008) (writing that the opinion-writing
process is mainly a search for supporting arguments and evidence).
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accordance with their own ideological preferences4 or are constrain-
ed by higher courts5 or other political branches.6 More recently,
scholars have taken a middle view that judges are influenced by
both legal and political factors.7
In exploring this question, interdisciplinary scholars have looked
primarily at voting behavior. Their consensus is that judicial ideol-
ogy influences how Supreme Court Justices8 and lower federal court
judges decide cases9 alike. For example, the political leanings of
federal Courts of Appeals judgesas measured by the party of the
president who appointed the judgeare highly correlated with the
ideological direction of their decisions.10 Ideological dampening
occurs when the three-judge panel is made up of judges appointed
by both political parties: a liberal judge moderates a conservative
majority; a conservative judge moderates a liberal majority.11
4. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
5. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1635 (1995) (describing stare decisis as a self-enforcing
equilibrium of doctrinal preferences among the courts).
6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Renegingon History?Playingthe Court/Congress/Presi-
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 616 (1991).
7. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 384-85 (2007).
8. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
303 (2007) (examining data based on Supreme Court Justices votes to measure ideological
preferences).
9. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
VotingRights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1493-94 (2008) (discussing how ideology
and legal doctrine impact judicial outcomes); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy?An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-
26 (2006) (examining the impact of judicial convictions on judicial application of the Chevron
framework); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
831, 835, 837 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, The New Legal Realism] (discussing
research that suggests the partisanship of judicial panels impacts voting); Daniel R. Pinello,
LinkingParty to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219,
220-21 (1999) (discussing research that suggests a correlation between judges political party
affiliation and judicial ideology); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial
Behavior?An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1100-01 (2001) (examining how political changes in the makeup of
Congress and the executive branch impact the judicial decision making of the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Votingon Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304-05 (2004) (discussing
concepts of ideological voting, dampening, and amplification).
10. See Sunstein et al., supra note 9, at 305-06.
11. That is, a panel with one Democratic-appointed judge sitting with two Republican-ap-
pointed judges (DRR) is likely to vote less conservatively than a panel with three Republican
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This focus on outcomes, while certainly important, fails to cap-
ture a crucial aspect of judicial behavior. It completely overlooks the
broader importance of the written opinion. These opinions provide
guidance to judges and prospective litigants.12 Case outcomes, by
themselves, are limited in informing how judges will decide future
cases. As Jack Knight has argued, scholars need to look at aspects
of the opinions accompanying the votes.13 Legal precedent serves as
the means by which judges validate their decisions and persuade
other jurists (and lawyers) to adopt their point of view.14
The relationship between judges ideology and their use of prece-
dent has been relatively unexplored by scholars in law and political
science. When reasoning their decision in a given case, do judges
vary from one another in how they perceive and use binding prece-
dent? Two competing hypotheses emerge. The first is that judges,
irrespective of their ideology, draw upon the same corpus of prece-
dent, but may differ in their interpretation and the conclusions they
reach. The second is that, depending on their ideology, judges draw
upon different subsets of precedent to explain their decisions. To
return to the party metaphor, the former posits that judges work
their way around the room; the latter contends that they talk mostly
with their friends.
In this Article, we examine how judges in the Courts of Appeals
cite Supreme Court precedent. We construct a unique dataset that
includes every published unanimous federal appellate decision from
the period 1971 to 2007. Specifically, the dataset contains every cit-
ed Supreme Court precedent for the years 1953 to 2007. Our dataset
comprises nearly 130,000 unanimous Courts of Appeals opinions
appointees (RRR); and a panel with one Republican-appointed judge sitting with two
Democratic-appointed judges (DDR) is likely to vote less liberally than a panel with three
Democratic-appointed judges (DDD). See id. at 304.
12. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 269 (2006)
([L]ooking to outcomes rather than opinions leads to the wrong conclusion of what the court
did.); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517,
526 (2006) ([T]he primary power of doctrine lies in its ability to influence decisions by lower
courts.).
13. Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Askingthe Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmak-
ing?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1533 (2009).
14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 745 (8th ed. 2011) ([P]recedent
projects a judges influence more effectively than a decision.).
2016] FRIENDLY PRECEDENT 1795
and nearly 600,000 citations to Supreme Court precedent.15 We
assign ideological scores to each precedent, using competing mea-
sures and methodologies, and distinguish whether judges are citing
each precedent favorably (following) or unfavorably (distinguishing
or criticizing).
Our central finding is that panel composition consistently and
systematically influences which precedents appear in majority opin-
ions. On average, panels comprised of three Democratic-appointed
judges (DDD) favorably cite the most liberal ideological precedent.
The addition of each Republican-appointed judge to the panel pro-
duces favorable citations to more conservative precedent, with a
panel of three Republican-appointed judges (RRR) citing the most
conservative precedent. The effect also occurs when examining the
individual judge authoring the unanimous opinion: Republican-ap-
pointed authors cite more conservative precedent than Democratic-
appointed authors.
Panel composition similarly influences judges use of unfavorable
Supreme Court precedent. Panels of all Democratic-appointed
judges criticize or distinguish the most conservative precedent. As
more Republican-appointed judges are selected to sit on the panel,
the panel criticizes and distinguishes increasingly more liberal
precedent. Panels of all Republican-appointed judges criticize or
distinguish the most liberal precedent.
Judges have a great deal of discretion over which binding prece-
dent to cite and significant leeway in determining how to justify
their decisions and how to tailor their written opinions.16 In much
the same way that one might gravitate toward friends when
15. The full constructed dataset has information on en banc as well as three-panel
opinions. In this Article, we focus on the latter, and therefore exclude observations from the
former. Our dataset of all three-panel opinions has 722,814 citations of Supreme Court
precedent in 143,419 opinions. For simplicity and consistency of our analysis, we exclude the
10.61 percent of opinions (and 18.10 percent of citations) from those opinions with a dissent
(whether on outcome or reasoning). Including the citations from majority opinions in Courts
of Appeals cases with a dissent does not change any of our results.
16. Previous scholarly work has suggested that judges may cite friendly precedent when
the citation is purely discretionary. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in
Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 91 (2008)
(examining the propensity of judges to cite along political lines when citing out-of-circuit
precedent). This Article goes a step further by illustrating that the propensity to cite friendly
precedent is strong and consistent, even when looking at binding precedent.
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entering a party, judges gravitate toward friendly precedent when
writing judicial opinions. Our findings are notable because they pro-
vide strong evidence that different judges have different conceptions
of which precedents are binding. Further, when judges restrict an-
alysis in their opinions to certain friendly binding precedent, they
may create two distinct echo chambers in case law.
Our Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief literature
review on legal precedent. Part II discusses the construction of our
new dataset. Part III describes our results. Part IV discusses the
implications of our findingsspecifically, the practical relevance of
precedent for the development of the common law. The final Section
summarizes and concludes.
I. EXISTING LITERATURE ON PRECEDENT
As a formal matter, judges are bound by legal precedent.17
Adherence to precedent, or stare decisis, provides the foundation of
the common law. Judges may prefer to follow only their own prece-
dent, but they realize that the import of their own decisions rests on
their fellow jurists recognizing the relevance and persuasion of
those decisions.18 In this regard, opinions are a repeated game in
which judges collectively benefit from a mutual respect for the
common law.19 This behavior is borne out empirically: when
deciding cases, judges consistently acknowledge the importance of
precedent.20
17. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?,
46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 828 (1994) ([T]he Constitution does compel adherence to Supreme
Court precedents.).
18. For a discussion of the practical importance of precedent, see William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON.
249, 273 (1976). See also Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571 (1987) (An
appeal to precedent is a form of argument, and a form of justification, that is often as
persuasive as it is pervasive.) (footnote omitted).
19. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
63, 67 (1994) ([A] judge will faithfully follow statute and precedent because he wishes to
create precedents in new areas of law that will be obeyed by other judges.); see also Frank
Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 371 (2005)
(noting that lower court judges follow the law more out of preference than fear of reversal).
20. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279,
1283 (2008) (noting that, in cases involving constitutional issues in the first two Roberts Court
Terms, the Court claimed precedent as a basis for its decision).
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At the same time, judges have considerable discretion when writ-
ing opinions.21 This discretion extends to the selection of which
precedents are cited in a written opinion. Karl Llewellyn described
judicial selection of precedent as involving two contradictory pur-
suits: freeing oneself from unwelcome precedent while capitalizing
welcome precedents.22 For Llewellyn, judges navigate through
existing precedent, selectively choosing the precedent that best
supports their decision.23 Jerome Frank similarly wrote that [t]he
judge, in determining what is the law of the case, must choose and
select, and it is virtually impossible to delimit the range of his
choice and selection.24 Even if the same precedent were cited in a
decision, judges may treat the precedent differentlythat is, favor-
ably or unfavorably. Herman Oliphant wrote, Each precedent
considered by a judge ... rests at the center of a vast and empty
stadium. The angle and distance from which the case is to be viewed
involves the choice of a seat.... [The judge] can and must choose.25
Scholars have begun to explore the interplay between judges and
legal precedent. Drawing upon the psychology and sociology of small
groups, they suggest that panels reach decisions collaboratively
and that, during deliberations, the judge in the political minority
(the odd one out) brings insights that the judges in the political
majority may have overlooked.26
Another prominent theory suggests that the odd-one-out judge
acts as a whistleblower or a watchdog, threatening to author a
21. See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkins Chain
Novel Theory: Studyingthe Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1203 (2005) (finding
that judges are liberated to act ideologically upon finding the case presents an issue of first
impression); Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes
of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 971-72 (1996) (concluding
that Justices are rarely bound by precedent). But see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A.
Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting
Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (It does not matter whether an
appellate judge agrees with established precedent; we are bound to apply established
precedent in deciding cases before us.).
22. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 68 (1977).
23. See id.
24. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 138 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1985).
25. Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 73 (1928).
26. See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 658 (1993);
POSNER, supra note 3, at 31; see also Miles & Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, supra note
9, at 845; Sunstein et al., supra note 9, at 303-07.
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dissenting opinion that highlights how the political majoritys opin-
ion fails to respect precedent.27 The whistleblower theory suggests
that the binding precedent cited by a panel with, for example, two
conservative judges and a liberal judge (DRR) will be different than
the precedent cited by a panel with three conservative judges
(RRR).28 Whether the sociological or whistleblowing theory applies,
we should see different precedent cited in the written opinions of
mixed panels, as compared to the opinions of three-of-a-kind panels.
Even if the opinion of the judges in the political majority is not
unprincipled,29 the threat of a dissenting vote may moderate out-
comes in mixed panels. Dissents are costly to all three judges; the
odd-one-out judge may be able to sway her colleagues toward her
preferred outcome if they do not feel strongly one way or the other.30
Although rates of dissent are often low, observed rates of dissent
tend to underestimate the level of disagreement about the vote.31
Therefore, a credible threat of dissent may force the author of the
opinion to moderate the policy, the breadth, or the reach of the
written opinion.32 That is, the ideological content of a unanimous
decision will be moderated in order to satisfy the odd-one-out judge.
The precedents themselves provide a strong proxy for the ideo-
logical flavor of the opinion.33 If a conservative decision is broad and
far-reaching, it stands to reason that the authoring judge will likely
favorably cite more conservative Supreme Court precedent and
criticize liberal Supreme Court precedent. If the conservative
decision is narrower, the authoring judge will likely also favorably
27. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowingon the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998).
28. See id. at 2161.
29. POSNER, supra note 3, at 30-31.
30. See id. at 31; Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 108 (2011).
31. See Joshua B. Fischman, EstimatingPreferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consen-
sus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 788 (2011) (describing how the disutility of writing separately
may result in a judge signing on to the majority, notwithstanding her dissatisfaction).
32. See Cliff Carrubba et al., Who Controls the Content of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56
AM. J. POL. SCI. 400, 402 (2012); Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling
Collegial Courts (3): Judicial Objectives, Opinion Content, Votingand Adjudication Equilibria
16, 19 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 08-56, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1296071 [https://perma.cc/48RC-TQJV].
33. See Frank B. Cross, The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 693, 707-09 (2012).
2016] FRIENDLY PRECEDENT 1799
cite relatively liberal precedent. Thus, there are good reasons to
suggest that moderation or ideological dampening will influence the
ideological content of the written opinion as well as the outcome of
the case.
Previous interdisciplinary work has examined citations of prece-
dent as a measure of the influence of particular decisions, as well
as the importance or quality of decisions, judges, circuits, and
schools of thought.34 Scholars have recently studied citations to Su-
preme Court precedent by lower courts to examine the impact and
ideology of the Supreme Court precedent.35
Other studies test the idea that citations to precedent may reflect
certain biases of the judge writing the opinion. Federal appellate
judges are more likely to cite decisions written by politically aligned
judges when citing out-of-circuit decisions.36 Among state courts,
pro-plaintiff decisions disproportionately cite pro-plaintiff prece-
dent, and pro-defendant decisions favor pro-defendant precedent.37
Studies also suggest that judges implicitly recognize that the
higher judicial landscape influences the degree to which they can
challenge precedent. The obvious influence is the Supreme Court:
lower federal courts are more likely to treat precedent unfavorably
when the ideological distance between the enacting Supreme Court
34. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY OF REPUTATION, at ix (1990); Mita
Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some
Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 223 (2001); Gregory
A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83 (1983); Choi &
Gulati, supra note 16; Frank B. Cross, Determinants of Citations to Supreme Court Opinions
(and the Remarkable Influence of Justice Scalia), 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 177 (2010); James
H. Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16,
16-17 (2008); James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuringthe Legal
Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); Daniel M.
Katz & Derek K. Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American
Federal Judiciary, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 457 (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Influence of Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385 (1993); William M.
Landes et al., Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). For an early discussion of the potential of studying citations, see
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, 2 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 381, 402 (2000) ([C]itations analysis is a versatile, rigorous, practicaland, increas-
ingly, an inexpensivetool of empirical research.).
35. See generally Cross, supra note 33; Thomas G. Hansford et al., The Information
Dynamics of Vertical Stare Decisis, 75 J. POL. 894 (2013).
36. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 16, at 101-02, 102 tbl.4.
37. See Anthony Niblett, Do Judges Cherry Pick Precedents to Justify Extra-Legal
Decisions?: A Statistical Examination, 70 MD. L. REV. 234, 235 (2010).
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and the contemporary Supreme Court is greater.38 The relevant
landscape may also be ones own court, where the threat of en banc
review affects judges decisions to cite Supreme Court precedent fa-
vorably or unfavorably.39
The citation of precedent has both a spatial and temporal di-
mension. The spatial dimension can be decomposed to vertical and
horizontal dimensions: vertical precedent is hierarchical and
binding upon lower courts within the same jurisdiction; horizontal
precedent is nonbinding for courts in other jurisdictions, but none-
theless may serve as persuasive reasoning. Sharing a common
methodological approach or using citation analysis or social network
theory, studies have found instances of both vertical40 and horizon-
tal41 influences of precedent.
The clear conceptual distinctions between these directional trans-
missions of precedent set out in this literature are likely blurred in
practice. Courts, whether citing binding precedent or persuasive
precedent, have considerable discretion in determining whether the
precedent is germane to the case before them. The focus of this
Article is on vertical precedent: the corpus of Supreme Court
precedent that federal appellate judges are constitutionally bound
to follow.
38. See Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 902 (2010).
39. See Rachel K. Hinkle, Strategic Anticipation of En Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 27 (Feb. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2365030 [https://perma.cc/K2EE-HSRP].
40. See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 34, at 16; Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and
Judicial Decision Making: Lower Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW &
SOCY REV. 325, 339 (1987).
41. See Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innova-
tion: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975, 985
(1981); Peter Harris, Ecology and Culture in the Communication of Precedent AmongState Su-
preme Courts, 1870-1970, 19 LAW & SOCY REV. 449, 476 (1985); Robert J. Hume, The Impact
of Judicial Opinion Language on the Transmission of Federal Circuit Court Precedents, 43
LAW & SOCY REV. 127, 145, 147 (2009); Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence
of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict
Cases, 40 LAW & SOCY REV. 135, 146-48 (2006) (finding that judges are more likely to adopt
reasoning from more prestigious circuits); Russell Smyth & Vinod Mishra, The Transmission
of Legal Precedent Across the Australian State Supreme Courts over the Twentieth Century,
45 LAW & SOCY REV. 139 (2011); David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal
Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOCY REV. 337,
357-58 (1997).
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II. DATA
A. Our Dataset
We construct a unique dataset to analyze how federal appellate
courts cite Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, we examine pub-
lished federal appellate decisions in the Federal Reporter (F.2d and
F.3d) during the period 1971 to 2007 that cite to Supreme Court
precedent decided from 1953 to 2007.
Our study takes advantage of the institutional design of random
assignment within federal appellate courts to address potential
problems of selection. At the oral argument stage, federal appellate
courts randomly assign judges and cases to panels.42 This feature
provides a clear and straightforward identification strategy. The
intuition of random assignment of cases is best compared to observ-
ing baseball hitters over the course of a season.43 Briefly stated, be-
cause batters generally face the same distribution of pitchers over
the course of a season (or several seasons), one can attribute differ-
ences in performance (for example, batting average) to the hitters
themselves rather than other factors (for example, differences in
opposing pitchers).44 Similarly, because federal appellate judges are
randomly assigned to panels, one can credibly attribute differences
in outcome over a large number of cases to the judges rather than
to case characteristics.45
While several characteristicsfor example, age, gender, ethnicity,
and prior legal experience46may distinguish judges from one
42. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, DefiningDicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1005 (2005); see also Revesz, supra note 9, at 1134. It is worth noting that the selection of
cases that proceed to oral argument is not random. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34
allows circuits to adjudicate some appeals prior to oral argumenta nonrandom process that
culls cases that are frivolous, cases that involve dispositive issues already authoritatively
decided, or cases where the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the appeal.
43. For a full explanation, see David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw:




46. Some scholars argue that judges background characteristics do not significantly
predict how they decide cases. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Backgrounds on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995). But
see Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, IdentifyingJudicial Empathy: Does HavingDaughters Cause
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another and may influence how they decide cases, this Article fo-
cuses on judicial ideology. Using the political party of the appointing
President as a proxy for judicial ideology, all federal appellate judg-
es during this time period are identified as being either Democrats
or Republicans. If panel composition has no effect on outcomes or
citations, one would expect that panels, deciding a similar distribu-
tion of cases, would (1) reach similar outcomes and (2) use precedent
similarly. If, however, panel composition does affect judicial behav-
ior, then we should observe differences in how different panels
decide cases and how they use precedent. Judicial behavior scholars
have exhaustively examined case outcomes; we focus on judges use
of precedent.
Each observation in our dataset is a citation in a federal Court of
Appeals case to a Supreme Court precedent. Drawn from multiple
sources,47 the resulting dataset contains detailed information about
the federal appellate court decision and the Supreme Court prece-
dent cited. Our universe of citations to Supreme Court precedent
comes from Westlaw. As part of its online subscription, Westlaw
provides a service called Keycite, which reports subsequent cases
that cite Supreme Court precedent. For this study, Westlaw provid-
ed access to its data to identify all citations to Supreme Court
precedent (federal and state), which produced over five million
citations.48
We look only at unanimous opinions of the federal Courts of
Appeals. The reason for restricting our analysis to this subset of
decisions is methodological. We exclude dissenting opinions because
Westlaw does not indicate which individual judge cited the prece-
Judges to Rule for Womens Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37, 52 (2015) (arguing that gender-
related factors influence how judges decide cases); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges
Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmakingin the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J.
1759, 1787 (2005) (same).
47. For a discussion of these sources, see infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. These
datasets contained common identifiersfor example, federal docket number and judges full
nameswhich we use to combine the datasets. 
48. It is worth noting that the resulting dataset represents only a limited subset of the
citations in federal appellate cases. The data set excludes opinions not included in the Federal
Reporter. More significantly, it excludes appellate cases that do not cite Supreme Court prece-
dent (which comprises approximately 58 percent of the total federal appellate cases). In
addition, given the Articles focus on three-judge panels, the dataset excludes en banc deci-
sions.
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dent. All citations, rather, are lumped together. This makes
comparison of citations across different cases extremely difficult
without knowing which opinion cited the precedent (that is, the ma-
jority opinion or the dissenting opinion). Accordingly, we compare
only those cases in which all three judges agree with the outcome
and sign on to a single written opinion.49 This restriction allows us
to easily compare precedent used by different panels, but it does
introduce an element of nonrandomization in panel composition.
The proportion of mixed panels (DDR and DRR) is likely greater in
a set of cases with a dissenting opinion. Due to the small fraction of
dissents, however, this nonrandomization is unlikely to be driving
our results.50 Our final dataset comprises 591,936 citations to
Supreme Court precedent in 127,668 Courts of Appeals written
opinions.
Each citation contains information about the federal appellate
case: Keycite provides the federal reporter number and docket num-
ber; jurisdiction and corresponding circuit; date of the decision; and
the depth of treatment (ranging from one to four stars). Each cita-
tion also contains substantive information about the underlying
federal appellate case. The Federal Judicial Center maintains the
United States Courts of Appeals database, which provides, in part,
the nature of the suit (such as bankruptcy, habeas, et cetera) and
the outcome of the appeal (such as affirmed, reversed, dismissed,
and so on). Each citation also identifies the judges who participated
on the panel. Because the United States Courts of Appeals database
removes the names of the judges, obtaining them required a textual
analysis of every federal reporter opinion that extracted this infor-
mation. The text of all federal appellate decisions, dating back to
1950, is publicly available on Public.Resource.org, a website that
49. Of course, there still may be some level of disagreement between judges in these unan-
imous cases. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 30, at 102; Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating
Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus Voting, 54 J.L. & ECON. 781, 784 (2011);
Joshua B. Fischman, Decision-MakingUnder a Norm of Consensus: A Structural Analysis of
Three-Judge Panels 2, 16 (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912299 [https://perma.cc/9ZJD-UZ23].
50. Cases with a dissenting opinion (at least, in part) represent about 9 percent of cases
over the entire period covered by our dataset. Further, we have run all the tests with the
entire dataset, including citations from dissenting opinions. The results are entirely consis-
tent with our reported results. For ease of analysis, however, we elect to report the results
from unanimous decisions only.
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makes government documents available online.51 Accompanying the
identity of each judge is the President who appointed the judge to
the appellate court,52 also available from the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter.53
Each observation also contains information about the Supreme
Court precedent cited in the opinion. The substantive area of law
(criminal, First Amendment, judicial power, et cetera) involved in
the precedents underlying case comes from the United States
Supreme Court Database, which contains detailed information on
all Supreme Court decisions from 1953 to the present.54 Excluding
precedent prior to 1953 inevitably omits prominent cases that re-
main salient todayfor example, Commerce Clause cases from the
New Deal Era, such as Wickard v. Filburn55 or NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.56but is necessary to provide internally
consistent measures of precedent.
Not all citations to precedent are used the same way. Crucial for
our analysis, Westlaw also classifies the treatment of precedent as
either a positive citation or a negative citation. To avoid confu-
sion with our discussion of correlation, we will refer to these as
favorable or unfavorable citations. A favorable precedent is a
friendly precedent, one which the majority cites in support of its
own reasoning. An unfavorable citation is an unfriendly precedent,
which the majority criticizes or distinguishes. This latter category
also includes citations of superseded precedent or situations in
which the lower court declined to follow the precedent. Perhaps un-
51. A textual analysis program designed for this study extracted the citation, the docket
number(s), the circuit, the identification of each of the judges on the panel, and the authoring
judge of the majority opinion as well as any concurring or dissenting opinions. Opinions that
did not include a written opinion (simply listed in a Table of Cases) or that did not report the
judges on the panel were excluded from analysis.
52. Over 90 percent of federal appellate judges in the period of interest were first
appointed to the appellate court. For those who served first as district court judges (112), only
7 were appointed by a President of a different political party when nominated to the appellate
court. The data reflect these changes in political affiliation.
53. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.
nsf/page/export.html [https://perma.cc/3TWC-8W9R] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
54. The United States Supreme Court Database is available online. See Current Dataset:
2015 Release 01, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Aug. 17, 2015), http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php [https://
perma.cc/3SX9-N4WT].
55. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
56. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
2016] FRIENDLY PRECEDENT 1805
surprisingly, given constitutional hierarchy, the vast majority of the
precedent cited in our dataset, however, falls under friendly, or fa-
vorable, precedent (97.22 percent). That is, the majority follows an
overwhelming fraction of the Supreme Court precedent that it cites.
B. Measures of Ideological Content of Precedent
In distinguishing among different Supreme Court precedents, we
assign each precedent an ideological score. This allows us to ascer-
tain whether the majority opinion in each case is citing to liberal or
conservative Supreme Court precedent.
The United States Supreme Court Database identifies for each
case the majority author and the Justices who joined the majority
opinion of each Supreme Court decision.57 We use scores developed
by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn to measure the ideology of each
Supreme Court Justice for each year.58 The scores range from -1 to
+1. The more liberal a judge, the more negative the score; the more
conservative a judge, the more positive the score. With this mea-
sure, the Supreme Court Justices in our dataset range from -0.8082
for Justice Douglas in the 1974 Term to 0.7190 for Justice Thomas
in 2007.
57. The original United States Supreme Court Database, see supra note 54, codes each
judgment as liberal or conservative, a subjective determination that may produce unreliable
estimates of ideology. For a discussion of the limitations of this database, see Anna Harvey,
The Will of the Congress, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 729, 733.
58. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 148 (2002).
For the updated Martin-Quinn scores, see Project Description, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://
mqscores.berkeley.edu/ [https://perma.cc/G4Z8-ACQF] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
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To create our ideology scores for each Supreme Court precedent,
we look to the majority opinions in these precedents. We create
three different ideology scores of precedents:
(1) Ideology of the median judge of the majority coalition (Me-
dian): For example, if a Supreme Court decision is unanimous
(9-0), then our measures of ideology will be that of the median
judge of the entire Court. If a Supreme Court decision is split 5-4
with liberal judges in the majority coalition, then the median of
the five judges in the majority will be less than zero. If the
Supreme Court decision is split 5-4 with conservative judges in
the majority, the median of the five judges in the majority will
be greater than zero. This measure comports with recent liter-
ature finding that the majority opinion will fall at the ideal point
of the median member of the coalition.59
(2) Mean ideology of the judges of the majority coalition (Mean):
One might be concerned that the median judge does not reflect
the influence that other judges, including those with outlier
ideologies, may have on the written opinion. The mean average
59. See Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case
Outcome Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411 (2009); Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag,
Takingthe Measure of Ideology: Empirically MeasuringSupreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J.
1 (2009); see also Tom S. Clark & Benjamin Lauderdale, LocatingSupreme Court Opinions
in Doctrine Space, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 871, 872 (2010).
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ideology of majority coalition judges will, however, capture this
collective effect.
(3) Ideology of the author of the majority opinion (Author): The
authoring judge of the written opinion may best reflect the ideo-
logical content of Supreme Court precedent. For example, take
two 9-0 Supreme Court decisions. The ideological content of the
written opinion may differ depending on whether a liberal judge
or a conservative judge authored the opinion. Further, judges on
the lower court may be attracted to precedent written by Su-
preme Court Justices with whom they share ideological views.
The author measure of ideology has greater variance than the
median and mean scores of ideology.
Two examples of Supreme Court precedent from the 1994-1995
Term may prove illustrative. In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme
Court was split 5-4.60 The majority, comprising Chief Justice
Rehnquist with Justices OConnor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
limited Congresss powers under the Commerce Clause.61 The four
liberal judgesJustices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg
dissented.62 In terms of Martin-Quinn ideal scores, the median judge
of the majority was Chief Justice Rehnquist. His ideological score
for the 1994-1995 Term was 0.3626. Chief Justice Rehnquist also
authored the majority opinion. By our measure, the author score is
the same as the median score for this case. The mean score for the
five judges in the majority was 0.3435. These ideological scores
reflect the conservative nature of the majority coalition and, by our
measure, the conservative nature of this precedent.
Now consider U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.63 Here, the
Supreme Court was split 5-4, but this time Justice Kennedy voted
with Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.64 The medi-
an judge on the majority, in terms of ideal points, was Justice
Souter. His ideological score for the 1994-1995 Term was -0.2524.
The mean score for the five judges of the majority coalition was
very similar, -0.2589. This score reflects the liberal nature of the
60. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
61. See id. at 567.
62. See id. at 602-31.
63. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
64. See id. at 781.
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majority coalition and the liberal nature of this precedent. Justice
Stevens authored the majority opinion.65 Consequently, with the au-
thor ideological score of -0.6324, Thornton appears more liberal than
when we use the median or mean score.
These scores, of course, may not be perfect representations of the
ideology of each Supreme Court precedent. For example, readers
may be concerned that the median of a majority coalition on any
given issue is not always certain,66 or that the median Justice may
not control the content of the opinions.67 Although this may be true
of the median, this problem is less pervasive in our second measure
of ideology, using the mean score of the majority coalition.
Accordingly, each of our three measures of ideology by themselves
may be imperfect, but taken together, we argue that they capture
the essence of the ideological direction of the Supreme Courts de-
cision. All three of our ideological measures indicate that Lopezwas
a conservative precedent and Thornton was a liberal precedent. Our
continuous variable provides a more nuanced description of the ideo-
logical flavor than simple binary measures that classify Supreme
Court precedent as either liberal or conservative.
Readers may be concerned that the Martin-Quinn scores are not
directly comparable from year to year68 and may generate a noisy
measure of judicial ideology. As a robustness check, we have per-
formed all of our tests using an alternative measure of Supreme
Court ideology generated by Michael Bailey.69 His alternative mea-
sure of ideology produces comparable preference estimates for
Presidents, members of Congress, and Supreme Court Justices, bas-
ing the ideological measurement on positions taken by individual
Justices, members of Congress, and Presidents on Supreme Court
cases that are directly comparable across institutions. In these
bridge observations, the aforementioned actors take positions on
issues that may have been decided earlier or were before another
65. See id. at 782.
66. See Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Tom S. Clark, The Supreme Courts Many Median
Justices, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 847, 860 (2012).
67. See Carrubba et al., supra note 32, at 400.
68. For a discussion of the limitations of using the Martin-Quinn scores for comparisons
over time, see Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Miscon-
ceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 827 (2010).
69. See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and Institutions
for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 435-40, 444-46 (2007).
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institution.70 We re-run our analysis (median, mean, author) using
the Bailey scores as a robustness check for all of our empirical tests,
generating consistent results with respect to point estimates and
statistical significance.71
C. Summary Statistics
Our dataset includes 591,936 citations to Supreme Court pre-
cedent that are drawn from 127,668 unanimous federal appellate
cases. There are an average of 4.63 Supreme Court precedents cited
per case. Table 2 provides the summary statistics. The majority of
citations are from published majority opinions. A probable explan-
ation for the small number of unpublished opinions is that, by their
nature of judges electing not to publish them, they involve more
routine issues and are perhaps less likely to cite Supreme Court
precedent.72
Table 2 also reports the permutations of the panel composition,
based on the political party of the President appointing each judge
to the federal bench. The least common composition was all
Democratic-appointed judges (DDD, 8.8 percent) followed by all
Republican-appointed judges (RRR, 21.5 percent). Two Democratic-
appointed and one Republican-appointed panels occurred nearly
one-third of the time (DDR, 29.6 percent). The most common
composition was two Republican-appointed and one Democratic-
appointed panels (DRR, 40.1 percent). Over the entire time period,
over 60 percent of panels were Republican-appointed majorities.
70. See id. at 438. Bailey uses the example of Justice Thomas in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992), in which he wrote that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was
wrongly decided. See Bailey, supra note 69, at 439. Justice Thomass decision in Casey
informs how he would have voted on Roe.
71. We do not report our results with the Bailey scores here, but they are available upon
request.
72. It is difficult to define the universe of unpublished opinions. Westlaw makes available
online some unpublished opinions that are not included in the Federal Reporter. Although it
includes a broader set of unpublished opinions, Westlaw does not necessarily include all
unpublished opinions.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Our Dataset
Number of citations (observations) 591,936
Number of unique Courts of Appeals cases 127,668
















Favorable (cited, followed, discussed, etc.) 97.22%
Unfavorable (criticized, distinguished, etc.) 2.78%












District of Columbia 5.5%
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III. RESULTS
A. Friendly Precedent
We begin by examining friendly precedent. We look at which
precedent judges gravitate toward. We find that judges consistently
gravitate toward precedent that is friendly in terms of political
alignment.
There are clear differences in the way different panel composi-
tions cite precedent. Figure 1 shows the average ideology score of
Supreme Court precedent cited, based on the median Justice of the
majority coalition. Recall that the higher the score, the more con-
servative, on average, the cited precedent. Therefore, the higher the
bar in our graph, the more conservative the precedent.
The graph illustrates that favorably cited precedents are increas-
ingly conservative as more Republican-appointed judges are added
to the panel. A panel of all Democratic-appointed judges (DDD), on
average, favorably cites the most liberal precedent. As more Repub-
lican-appointed judges are assigned to the panel, more conservative
precedent is favorably cited. A panel of all Republican-appointed
judges (RRR), on average, favorably cites the most conservative pre-
cedent. Figure 1 provides graphical support for our hypothesis that
judges gravitate toward friendly precedent when describing the
state of the law.
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Figure 1. Ideology of Favorably Cited Precedent by Panel
Composition
While not shown in Figure 1, the graphs for our mean and author
scores are very similar.73 Table 3 provides average precedent scores
for favorable precedentusing median, mean, and authorbroken
down by panel composition and by the treatment of the precedent.
The table reveals that the higher the ideological score, the more con-
servative our measure of the precedent. This pattern is monotonic
and similar. Under all three of our measures of ideology, the pre-
cedents cited favorably by the Courts of Appeals are increasingly
conservative with more Republican-appointed judges on the panel.
73. These graphs are not shown here but are available upon request.
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Table 3. Ideology of Favorably Cited Precedent by Panel
Composition
Panel Median Mean Author
DDD -0.0066 -0.0279 -0.0112
DDR 0.0027 -0.0207 -0.0048
DRR 0.0161 -0.0102 0.0058
RRR 0.0266 -0.0021 0.0142
While Table 3 provides the raw, unadjusted precedent scores, our
findings are robust, controlling for the circuit and the year that the
Court of Appeals decision was handed down. Table 4 presents the
regression-adjusted effect of panel composition. Our regression
takes the following form:
precedentij= + .republicansi + .Xi + j.
Precedentijis a continuous variable measuring the ideological score
of the Supreme Court precedent (j) cited in the Court of Appeals
opinion (i). We use three different dependent variables to measure
the ideological score of the precedent: median, mean, and author.
Our main right-hand-side variable of interest is republicansithe
number of Republican-appointed judges on the three-judge panel of
the lower court that decided case i. We also include control vari-
ables, Xi, circuit dummies, and dummies for the year of the lower
court decision. We cluster our standard errors at the Court of Ap-
peals decision level.
We hypothesize that the conservative lean of the favorably cited
precedent will be positively correlated with the number of Repub-
lican judges ( > 0). Our results, set out in Table 4, confirm this
hypothesis. The results are as expected and are highly significant.
For example, looking at the median score of ideology, adding a
Republican to the panel results in significantly more conservative
precedent being favorably cited.
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clustered by Court of
Appeals case
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Circuit dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575,411 575,411 575,411
R-Squared 0.0416 0.0314 0.0098
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
The most noticeable difference between the regression-adjusted
and the raw estimates is that the regression-adjusted results are
less dramatic. Controlling for yearly changes in cited precedent
helps explain this reduction.74 The raw estimates produce larger co-
efficients, because cases are treated as if they all occurred in the
same period. This assumption ignores the fact that in later years of
the data (2000-2007), a greater percentage of Republican-appointed
judges composed the federal appellate bench. Accordingly, Repub-
lican-majority panels were disproportionately represented during
a period when cited precedent was generally more conservative.
Ignoring this time trend overstates the differences in panel com-
position.
The relationship between panel composition and precedent, how-
ever, remains the same. Although the magnitude of the change
appears smaller in the regression-adjusted specification, the results
remain significant and again show that precedent monotonically
74. The point estimates for the regression, absent controls for year of decision but con-
trolling for circuit, closely match the raw estimates from Table 3.
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increases in conservative ideology as the number of Republicans on
the panel increases. As with the raw estimates, favorably cited
precedent is consistently more conservativeand unfavorably cited
precedent is consistently more liberalas the number of Republi-
cans on the panel increases.
From Table 3, the ideological difference between the favorable
citations by all Democratic- and all Republican-appointed panels is
approximately 0.03 in all three measures of ideology. To place some
perspective on what this difference in ideology means, the ideo-
logical difference in the 1994-1995 Term between Justices Kennedy
and OConnor was only 0.0073. The difference between favorable
citations by DDD and RRR panels is over four times greater in
magnitude. While our regression results are inherently difficult to
directly compare to the difference between two individual Justices,
our results suggest that the change in citation behavior with panel
composition has practical as well as statistical significance.
B. Unfriendly Precedent
When does a judge criticize or distinguish Supreme Court prece-
dent? When does a judge gravitate away from seemingly binding
precedent? We find that judges gravitate away from precedent that
is unfriendly in terms of political alignment. 
Our examination of unfriendly precedent also reveals a strong
relationship between judicial ideology and selected precedent, this
time with the correlation being negative. Figure 2 shows that a
panel of all Democratic-appointed judges (DDD), on average, un-
favorably cites the precedent with the most conservative ideology
scores. As more Republican-appointed judges are assigned to the
panel, the unfavorable precedent appears increasingly more neg-
ative, with a panel of all Republican-appointed judges (RRR), on
average, unfavorably citing the most liberal precedent.
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Figure 2. Ideology of Unfavorably Cited Precedent by Panel
Composition
Table 5, replicating Table 3 for unfriendly precedent, shows
similar patterns when looking at the mean and author. The more
Republican-appointed judges on the panel, the more liberal the
precedent the panel cites unfavorably. This trend is monotonic along
all three measures.
Table 5. Ideology of Unfavorably Cited Precedent by Panel
Composition
Panel Median Mean Author
DDD 0.0120 -0.0131 0.0040
DDR 0.0043 -0.0191 -0.0087
DRR -0.0083 -0.0340 -0.0192
RRR -0.0105 -0.0376 -0.0197
Table 6 reports that the regression-adjusted estimates of un-
friendly precedent tell a similar story. It shows the statistically
significant effect of panel composition on the content of written
opinions. Adding a Republican-appointed judge to the panel results
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in significantly less conservative precedent being criticized or
distinguished.







clustered by Court of
Appeals case
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Circuit dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,473 16,472 16,473
R-Squared 0.0219 0.0217 0.0055
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
The ideological differences in precedentboth favorable and
unfavorablebased on panel composition are perhaps even more
meaningful than at first blush for two reasons. First, we focus on
only unanimous decisions. Unlike the Supreme Court, federal
Courts of Appeals have a nondiscretionary docket.75 While one must
exercise caution when interpreting unanimity, it is reasonable to
infer that a significant percentage of these cases reflect true con-
sensus among the judges. These cases may be so straightforward
and uncontroversial that the difference in panel composition has
no bearing on either the outcome or the precedent cited. For com-
pleteness, we include all cases and do not undertake the subjective
exercise of parsing out these straightforward cases. The inclusion
of such cases, however, biases downward our point estimates.
Nevertheless, the effect of panel composition remains highly sta-
tistically significant.
75. See Caminker, supra note 17, at 823-24.
1818 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1789
A second factor to consider is that the political affiliation of the
appointing President is a blunt and noisy measure of judicial ideol-
ogy. If there is reason to believe that some Republican-appointed
judges are liberal or some Democratic-appointed judges are conserv-
ative, our measure of ideology of the lower court judges will dilute
the coefficients on panel composition more than if the ideology of all
judges were accurately coded. More generally, even if it were the
case that all conservatives are appointed by Republican Presidents
and all liberals are appointed by Democratic Presidents, our mea-
sure assumes that judicial ideology is dichotomous rather than
continuous. Despite this imprecision, we still find high levels of sig-
nificance, suggesting that the true effect of judicial ideology, along
a continuous measure, may be even larger.
The general pattern of favorably citing more conservative prece-
dent when more Republican-appointed judges are on the panel is
observed in most circuits when analyzing each circuit individually.
Further, we also run our results controlling for other factors such as
whether the case was published. These specifications are consistent
with our findings presented above. Finally, all of our results are
consistent when we use alternative measures of judicial ideology
created by Michael Bailey in his 2007 study.76
IV. DISCUSSION
This Article is meant as a step in formally accounting for the role
of judicial precedent in how judges decide cases. The existing liter-
ature has consistently found, across a wide array of specifications,
that judicial ideology affects case outcomes.77 This analysis, though
convincing, provides only a partial understanding of judicial be-
havior. In our view, a complete model must include precedent.
Irrespective of where one falls in the formalist-realist debate, or has
a view at all, judges use precedent when writing decisions. This
Article examines the interplay between judges ideology and the
precedent they cite.
76. See Bailey, supra note 69, at 433. These results are not reported here but are available
upon request.
77. See Cross, supra note 33, at 696-97.
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We find that the ideological composition of federal appellate
panelswhether a Democratic or Republican President appointed
members of the panelpowerfully predicts the type of precedent
they include in their opinions. Republican-appointed panels consis-
tently favor conservative precedent and disfavor liberal precedent,
and the reverse is true for Democratic-appointed panels. The type
of precedent cited is sensitive to the smallest changes in panel com-
position. The addition of a single Republican-appointed judge to the
panel correlates with the majority citing more conservative pre-
cedent on average, and the opposite is true with the addition of a
single Democratic-appointed judge.
Returning to our hypothetical of guests attending a crowded
party, judgesat least federal appellate judgesappear to gravitate
toward their friends. When writing opinions, judges consistently
select precedent from Justices sharing a similar ideology. Judges
do engage with ideologically dissimilar precedent, but these in-
stances compose an infinitesimal fraction of the precedent they cite.
Further, such precedent is primarily criticized, or distinguished,
rather than followed.
The strong correlation between judicial ideology and precedent
has potentially significant implications for the development of the
common law. The existing literature finds that when appellate
judges have discretion over the choice of precedentfor example,
choosing precedent from other circuitsthey choose precedent from
ideologically similar jurists.78 Our results suggest that judges exer-
cise even more discretion. Judges exhibit this discretion when
choosing Supreme Court precedentprecedent that, by definition,
they are constitutionally required to follow. For a plethora of
reasonssuch as limited appellate oversight and fact-intensive
questions of lawjudges engage in more discretion than judicial
hierarchy suggests.79 At the same time, judges care about the insti-
tutional role of precedent, going to great lengths to find doctrinal
support for their decisions.80
78. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 16, at 91, 119.
79. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 420 (2007).
80. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative Precedent and
Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 764 (2002) (explaining Justices
devotion to doctrine in their decisions).
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Our findings tell a story in which judges follow Supreme Court
precedent but differ dramatically in their conception of which pre-
cedent controls. Republican-appointed judges turn to conservative
precedent, while Democratic-appointed judges turn to liberal prece-
dent. This selection is consistent with the notion that judges adopt
a weak form of stare decisis.81 And perhaps more importantly, it
suggests that precedent is segmented, when a given precedent
speaks more, or perhaps only, to certain groups of judges and not to
others.
Given this finding, should we care? Perhaps we should not.
Although judicial ideology influences case outcomes, this effect oc-
curs at the margins. For the vast majority of cases, judges reach the
same results, irrespective of their judicial ideology.82 Accordingly, if
judicial ideology has at most a small effect on outcomes, then con-
cerns over any corresponding relationship between ideology and
precedent are similarly overstated.
We offer two responses to this consequentialist proposition. Our
first response emphasizes the importance of cases at the margin.
The common law is built not on routine cases, but on these cases at
the margin: when judges disagree with one another over which
party should prevail and the legal reasoning for that result.83 In
these cases, the divergence in how judges interpret and use prece-
dent has profound and lasting effects, not merely for the parties in
dispute, but for the common law itself, as these decisions are
repeatedly cited.84
81. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 112 (1989) (Weak stare decisis serves the interests of both groups.
It increases the effects of the opinions reached by the intellectually active judges, while
simultaneously easing the burden of deciding cases that falls on the shoulders of lazy judges.
In addition, judges will prefer a regime of weak stare decisis to a regime of strict stare decisis
because weak stare decisis broadens the latitude of judges and increases the demand for their
services vis-a-vis the legislature.).
82. See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 46, at 260 (finding that neither party of the
appointing President nor individual characteristics influence how judges decide cases in the
aggregate).
83. The U.S. Supreme Court is replete with closely-decided cases in which Justices
disagree over both outcome and controlling precedent. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (demonstrating a case in which the Court decided 5-4 to prohibit the
government from limiting independent political expenditures by nonprofit entities).
84. For example, since the end of the 2012 Term, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
has been cited 277 times by the U.S. Supreme Court and over 100,000 times by other lower
courts. See John Pressley Todd, Have United States Supreme Court Decisions Curtailed the
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Our second response speaks to all cases, at the margin or
otherwise. The common law is, by design, path-dependent.85 Each
published decision wields the potential to influence prospective
litigants, whether they litigate or not.86 Judges in the future may
choose this decision as precedent to support how they decide cases
before them. The import of a decision in the short term may be the
outcome (that is, which party prevails), but its long-term signifi-
cance lies in its reasoning. Viewed in this light, precedent is vital.
Our results suggest the formation of judicial spheres of influence:
Republican-appointed Justices holding greater sway over Republi-
can-appointed appellate judges, and similarly on the Democratic
side. As these judicial cliques develop, so too does the common law.
If precedent matters, then judges selection of it also matters. If
precedent becomes segmented based on judicial ideology, it leaves
open the possibility that the common law itself becomes segmented.
If one were to look only at decisions from panels consisting of
Republican-appointed judges, the common law might differ from
panels consisting of Democratic-appointed judges. Under random
assignment, the distribution of cases is comparable across different
panel compositions, but the tenor of their decisions may vary
dramatically. This partitioning becomes self-reinforcing as Repub-
lican- and Democratic-appointed judges gravitate to like-minded
precedent, both individually and collectively. To return to our party
metaphor, Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges may be in
the same room, but they are socializing only within their respective
group.
Coming full circleif earlier scholarship establishes that judicial
ideology influences case outcomes, and this Article provides support
that judicial ideology influences choice of precedentwhat is the
relationship between precedent and outcomes? Our intuition would
be that the two move in tandem: conservative precedents support
conservative outcomes, and liberal precedents support liberal
outcomes. Testing this hypothesis directly, however, is difficult
Miranda Rule Too Much or Is the Balance Just Right?, 7 PHX. L. REV. 371, 381 n.71 (2013).
85. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 603-04 (2001).
86. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966 (1979) (arguing how parties can resolve disputes
when using legal rules and case law to anticipate outcomes from litigation).
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because, in any given case, we observe only a single panels use of
precedent and decision. We do not observe the counterfactuala dif-
ferent panel composition unanimously deciding the same caseand
therefore cannot directly test for it.
Recent work on dissents, however, provides an alternative coun-
terfactual identification. Panel decisions that generate a dissent
involve judges looking at the same set of facts but disagreeing on
outcome based on different interpretations of the law.87 In this
subset of published cases, judges who disagree on the case outcome
disagree as to which binding precedent applies.88 Authoring judges
gravitate toward precedent ideologically similar to their own
views.89 The partitioning we observe on unanimous opinions follows
a similar path. Precedent cited by the majority is strongly correlated
with the majority author but not with the dissent; precedent cited
by the dissent is strongly correlated with the dissenting author but
not with the majority. Precedent cited by both the majority and dis-
senting judges are correlated with neither the dissenting nor the
majority author. These findings suggest that precedent and out-
comes closely correlate.
CONCLUSION
This Article is an empirical examination to better understand the
factors that influence how judges choose precedent when deciding
cases. It is important to identify the degree to which judges ideol-
ogies influence their choice of precedent. We show that judges cite
precedent friendly to their own views. This segmentation may sim-
ply reflect the partisanship of the political process extended to the
judiciary, but as we argue, it also has significant implications for the
common law.90 The segmentation may lead to distinct echo cham-
bers in the common law.
87. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study of Dissent, 42
INTL REV. L. & ECON. 60, 60 (2015).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. For a recent discussion of the politicization of the judicial confirmation process, see
generally Geoffrey R. Stone, UnderstandingSupreme Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP.CT.REV.
381. For an earlier account, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP
THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS at ix-xiii (1994).
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Our findings leave several questions unanswered. For example,
does the general trend we observe vary across and within circuits,
or even individual judges? It may be worth exploring which Justices
(and judges) are more likely to cite, and be cited by, both Repub-
lican- and Democratic-appointed judges. These jurists may share
common characteristics that inform our understanding of the
opinion-writing process. This Article cannot answer the normative
question of how the common law should develop, but we hope that
it will stimulate further inquiry.

